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Changes in poverty rates within a country, whether due to globalization
or some other source, can be usefully thought of as reﬂecting either
changes in aggregate resources (growth) for the country as a whole, or
changes in the within-country distribution of these resources (inequality).
Over the last twenty years China has experienced huge rates of economic
growth, reducing poverty. Although at the same time China has experi-
enced substantial increases in rural-urban and interregional inequality, the
increase in the size of the Chinese economic pie has much more than oﬀset
any increase in inequality for the vast majority of China’s households. Ra-
vallion and Chen (2004) report that although 17.6 percent of Chinese house-
holds were poor in 1985, the poverty rate had fallen by more than half by
2001.
Faced with evidence of high rates of aggregate growth and relatively
modest increases in inequality, and with evidence that poor households
have shared in the aggregate windfall, one might be tempted to conclude
that China’s recent experience has had clear net beneﬁts for almost all
households. Yet this conclusion (while possibly correct) isn’t justiﬁed by
the kinds of evidence given above. The kinds of changes described above
are likely to involve a large increase in the risk faced by Chinese house-
holds. Would a typical household in China in the early eighties, given a
choice between their “iron rice bowl” and the risky promises of economic
reform, have willingly chosen the latter? We can’t know without some way
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The welfare loss due to risk faced by households at a point in time is in-
timately related to changes in inequality in expenditures. In particular,
risk-averse households with time-separable preferences will tend to prefer
to smooth shocks to income over time, so that even entirely transitory
shocks to income will tend to have a permanent eﬀect on future consump-
tion expenditures. Thus, the same shocks to income that make next pe-
riod’s consumption uncertain will also determine the household’s position
in next period’s distribution of expenditures.
In this paper we exploit this link by using data on the evolution of ex-
penditure inequality to estimate both household risk preferences and the
welfare loss due to risk actually borne by urban Chinese households over
the period 1985–2001, an era during which China’s economy has under-
gone dramatic reforms and experienced remarkable growth. Others have
noted that increases in inequality imply that the rising tide of the aggregate
Chinese economy has not lifted all boats equally (Kahn and Riskin 2001).
Here we note that because households may change their position in the
wealth (and expenditure) distribution, merely looking at changes in in-
equality will understate the displacement and (ex ante) welfare loss experi-
enced by risk-averse households facing dramatic economic change.
Although the chief contribution of this paper is the application of a
method to infer household-level idiosyncratic risk from aggregate data on
the cross-sectional distribution of consumption, it also has something to say
about changes in inequality in the absence of this risk. In particular, we see
that although there has been a notable increase in inequality among urban
households, this increase is dwarfed by the increase in inequality between
rural and urban households. We are also interested in documenting any re-
lationship between globalization (as measured by changes in trade volume
across sectors) and changes in urban inequality. In section 14.3 we show that
after controlling for any eﬀects that globalization may have on aggregate ur-
ban consumption the trade shocks we measure can’t account for any of the
observed changes in inequality observed within the urban population.
Models having complete markets à la Arrow-Debreu yield fully Pareto
eﬃcient outcomes; in such a model any changes in inequality must be pre-
ferred by all market participants, and so they yield little in terms of inter-
esting policy implications. Complete market models that feature Gorman
aggregable preferences (Wilson 1968) yield the very strong prediction that
the distribution of consumption across households is invariant (see sub-
section 14.2.1 for an illustration and appendix A for a general treatment).
More interesting are models in which some friction prevents allocations
from being fully Pareto optimal, and that have enough dynamic structure
to yield interesting predictions regarding the evolution of the distribution
of consumption.
600 Ethan LigonTo estimate the importance of idiosyncratic risk we assume that all
households have similar preferences, and that these preferences exhibit
constant relative risk aversion (Arrow 1964). We further assume that all
households have access to credit markets on equal terms, and that house-
holds exploit these credit markets to smooth their consumption over time,
à la the permanent income hypothesis.1 Beyond this, we make no notably
restrictive assumptions. We allow quite arbitrary forms of technology and
shocks, and avoid the problem of measuring asset returns. Although this
framework is quite general in several dimensions, we will show that condi-
tional on the distribution of production shocks the model yields rather
sharp predictions regarding the evolution of the distribution of resources
across households. In particular, the model gives us the law of motion gov-
erning the inverse Lorenz curves that describe inequality in the economy;
the idiosyncratic risk borne by households can be shown to depend entirely
on the distribution of “relative surprises” experienced by the household.
The law of motion for inverse Lorenz curves allows us to make predic-
tions about the sequence of Lorenz curves we would expect to observe,
conditional on household risk preferences, on rates of aggregate economic
growth, and on the distribution of unforecastable shocks facing house-
holds in diﬀerent years, at diﬀerent wealth levels, and in diﬀerent occupa-
tions. By comparing realized and predicted Lorenz curves, we can estimate
these preferences and distributions. This same procedure yields a Markov
transition function mapping shares of consumption today into a probabil-
ity distribution over possible shares tomorrow, and we use this object to
calculate the risk borne by diﬀerently situated urban Chinese households
in diﬀerent years and to relate this risk to measures of globalization during
this period.
The key to the empirical strategy of this paper involves exploiting the re-
strictions placed on data by Euler equations to make statements about the
evolution of inequality. Related literature includes Deaton and Paxson
(1994), who derive a martingale property from the consumption Euler
equation and use several long panels of household-level expenditure data
to argue that within-cohort inequality in industrialized countries is in-
creasing over time, and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), who use
household panel data on expenditures from the United States and a more
completely speciﬁed general equilibrium model to estimate a law of motion
for the distribution of consumption. The central idea of those papers is to
exploit intertemporal restrictions to estimate the law of motion for indi-
vidual households’ consumption growth, and then in eﬀect to integrate
over households to infer what the law of motion is for the distribution of
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1. For the reader who regards this assumption as unreasonable, we note that if some house-
holds are constrained so as to not have equal access to credit markets, then our estimates of
risk for these households are likely to be underestimates.consumption across households. The present paper reverses these last two
steps—we derive equations that impose intertemporal restrictions on in-
dividual households’ consumption growth, but then integrate over these
equations to obtain restrictions on the law of motion for the distribution of
consumption across households before taking these restrictions to the
data. The cost of the procedure followed in this paper is that one can’t ex-
ploit all the information that would be available from the trajectories of
consumption for many diﬀerent individual households. The (closely re-
lated) beneﬁt is that we can get by without panel data, using instead only a
relatively limited set of data obtainable from repeated cross-sectional sur-
veys of household expenditures, of the sort that many countries conduct in
order, for example, to compute consumer price indexes.
14.2 An Example of Risk and Inequality
The central idea of this paper is to use evidence on changes in the cross-
sectional distribution of consumption to draw inferences about the welfare
of households. In this section we’ll construct a simple example, meant to il-
lustrate the connection between the evolution of inequality and household
welfare, while appendix A provides a more general treatment. As will be
seen, the connection between household welfare and changes in inequality
can be more complicated and interesting than one might suppose.
To set the stage for our example, consider an environment with many
households, but only two types (each type comprising one-half of the pop-
ulation), indexed by i   1, 2. There are two periods, indexed by t   1, 2.
Households of both types derive momentary utility from consumption ac-
cording to a logarithmic utility function:
(1) u(cit)   log(cit).
Both types of households also discount future utility using a common dis-
count factor,   ∈ (0, 1).
Critical to the example is that there be some source of underlying uncer-
tainty that may aﬀect the second-period distribution of consumption. Let
  ∈   denote the realized state of the economy in this second period. As-
suming  is ﬁnite, let Pr( ) denote the probability of state  being realized.
Per capita consumption in period tis some exogenously determined (but
possibly random) quantity c  t; we choose a normalization for consumption
so that c  1   1. The characteristic that distinguishes the two diﬀerent types
of households is that each type begins with diﬀerent shares of aggregate
consumption. In particular, let the consumption of type 1 households in
period 1 be c11   0.4, so that consumption of the second type is c21   0.6.
We now consider three diﬀerent market structures and ask how these in-
ﬂuence the evolution of inequality.
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When there are complete markets, we can exploit the second welfare the-
orem to compute changes in inequality for our example economy. Accord-
ingly, consider the planning problem of allocating consumption across rep-
resentative households of each type,
max
{ci1,{ci2( )} ∈ }i
 u(c11)   (1    )u(c21) 
  ∑
 ∈ 
Pr( ){ u[c11( )]   (1    )u[c22( )]},
subject to resource constraints in each period,
c11   c21   c  1,
and
c12( )   c22( )   c  2( ).
Here the parameter   is a “planning weight” that determines the weight of
type one households relative to type two in the planner’s problem. With the
form of utility function assumed above, it follows immediately from the
ﬁrst-order conditions that
c11    c  1
and
c12    c  2( ).
Note from this that the parameter   corresponds to the share of aggregate
consumption for type 1 households, and that this parameter doesn’t vary
across either dates or states. As a consequence, any Pareto eﬃcient out-
come in this example will assign 40 percent (the share of type one house-
holds in the initial period) of aggregate consumption to households of type
one in both periods, regardless of the realized value of  .
This point generalizes. When households have identical utility functions
featuring constant elasticities of substitution (of which logarithmic utility
is a special case) and when markets are complete, then we should expect the
distribution of consumption to be unchanging. Conversely, if the distribu-
tion of consumption is observed to change over time, then this is evidence
that either our assumptions regarding household preferences are mistaken
or markets are incomplete (Lucas 1992).
14.2.2 Segmented Markets
Taking our cue from subsection 14.2.1, we next imagine a particular sort
of simple market incompleteness that can give rise to nontrivial changes in
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of type i can engage in exchange with other households of the same type,
circumstances contrive to make it impossible for households of type 1 to
make exchanges with households of type 2. Thus, a social planner must
keep track of aggregate resources available to households of each type.
Within the set of type i households there will be perfect insurance, so we
can write ci2( )   c  i2( ), where c  i2( ) is the per capita consumption avail-
able to households of type i in state  .
To be concrete, suppose that the share of type 1 households happens to
fall from 0.4 in the ﬁrst period to 0.3 in the second, but that total con-
sumption across both groups remains constant. Then the ex post welfare
outcome for each household type relative to the complete markets case is
the same in the ﬁrst period, but in the second the diﬀerence is given by
(2) log(0.3)   log(0.4)    0.288
(3) log(0.7)   log(0.6)   0.154.
Though very contrived, this accounting seems to capture the usual idea
behind analyses of changes in inequality—in this case, poor households
(type 1) are hurt by an increase in inequality, while wealthy households
(type 2) fare better. The chief point missed by this idea is that in the face of
uninsured shocks individual households are likely to change their position
in the consumption distribution.
14.2.3 Credit Markets
We next eliminate the supposition of segmented markets and suppose
that households of both types can exchange debt in competitive credit mar-
kets. However, for whatever reason, we also suppose that households can’t
perfectly insure their future consumption, as they did in subsection 14.2.1.
We then derive intertemporal restrictions on the evolution of each house-
hold’s share of aggregate consumption. The key assumptions we exploit
here (and later in our empirical work) are that households all have similar
preferences featuring constant relative risk aversion, and that all house-
holds have access to credit on the same terms. Note that this latter as-
sumption is weaker than assuming that credit markets are perfect—in par-
ticular, it may be the case that at the interest rates faced by households for
some reason credit markets fail to clear.
At date 1, households of each type can exchange claims to consumption
at date 2 with other households at a price  , solving the problem
(4) max
bi
u(ci1   bi )    Eu(ci2   bi),
where E denotes the expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time 1, bi denotes the debt issued by a household of type i in the ﬁrst
period, and cit denotes the household’s time t consumption expenditures.
We modify our notation slightly to let the index i refer to individual
604 Ethan Ligonhouseholds i 1, . . . , n, while maintaining our assumption that all of these
households are of one of two distinct types. The modiﬁcation is necessary
because we want to consider the possibility that households of the same
type may face diﬀerent shocks, even though the distribution of these
shocks will be the same for all households of the same type ex ante.
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the household’s problem of
debt issuance indicate that the household will consume cit at t if the usual
Euler equation
(5) u (cit)   Eu (cit 1)
is satisﬁed.
Exploiting our assumption of logarithmic utility, equation (5) implies
that
1   E  
for i   1, 2, . . . , n.
Let
(6) εi       1
denote household i’s time 1 forecast error. Note from the properties of
equation (6) that Eεi   0, as is usual when evaluating forecast errors from
Euler equations. Note also from equation (5) and Jensen’s inequality we
have ci1/Eci2   1, so that
Eci2   ci1;
that is, expected consumption is increasing for both types of households.
Risk
The risk facing any individual household with consumption cit at time t
that may reduce its utility at time t   1 depends on the distribution on the
forecast error εi.
Let  itdenote household i’s consumption share at date t. Deﬁne the idio-
syncratic risk borne by the household at time 1 to be the ex ante loss in ex-
pected utility due solely to variation in the purely idiosyncratic shock εi, or
(7) Ri   u(c  2 i1)   E[ui(ci2)].
Here the ﬁrst term is the utility the household would obtain in period 2 if
the household’s share of expenditures was unchanged (as would be the case
if no household faced any idiosyncratic risk) and if the household knew in
advance what aggregate consumption would be in period 2. The second
term is the expected utility of the household given that it remained igno-





Risk and the Evolution of Inequality in China 605As demonstrated above, in a world with complete markets and the as-
sumed logarithmic preferences we work with here, it’s easy to establish that
each household’s share of aggregate consumption will remain constant,
eliminating all idiosyncratic risk. Thus, we can interpret the ﬁrst term of
equation (7) as the utility the household would obtain if no households
bore any idiosyncratic risk less the expected utility of consumption when
the household does bear this risk. It’s trivial to establish that this cardinal
measure of risk is uniquely consistent (up to a linear transformation of u)
with the notion of increasing risk deﬁned by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Because our measure of idiosyncratic risk is denominated in utils, it is
straightforward to construct a variety of useful measures of the welfare loss
associated with this risk.
Again, for the sake of concreteness, let us assume that log(1   εi) is dis-
tributed N(–vi
2/2, vi), with the consequence that Eεi   0, as is required by
our deﬁnition of the forecast error above, with vi a parameter equal to the
standard deviation of log(1   εi) for household i. With this assumption it
follows that household i’s idiosyncratic risk (that is, holding aggregate con-
sumption constant) is given by
Ri   .
Thus the ex ante welfare loss due to the uninsurability of idiosyncratic
shocks is simply equal to one-half the variance of log(1   εi).
Distribution
Now, how is this risk related to the evolution of inequality? Let
 ( i2⏐ i1) denote the Markov transition function for the household’s share
  between periods 1 and 2. Then the expression for household i’s time t
idiosyncratic risk, as deﬁned above, may be written
Ri   u(c  2 i1)    u(c  2  )d (  ⏐ i1).
We’ve already seen that we can compute risk Ri from knowledge of the dis-
tribution of i’s forecast errors εi, so this equation allows us to relate the
transition function   to the parameters of this distribution.
The Markov transition function  , which is critical for calculating aver-
age risk in the population, is also critical for understanding how the distri-
bution of resources changes over time. In particular, the distribution of
consumption shares (inverse Lorenz curves) {  t} will satisfy a law of mo-
tion
(8)   2(  ˆ)    {     ˆ}d (  ⏐ )d  1( ).
Accordingly, knowledge of the transition function   suﬃces to character-
ize both average risk and the evolution of inequality in the population.





606 Ethan Ligonconsumption can be used to draw inferences about household-level risk.
Recall that an individual household’s risk depends only on forecast errors
εi. In particular, we can use equation (6) to express   in terms of the distri-
bution of forecast errors in the population. Let εihave the cumulative prob-
ability distribution F(ε⏐ i). Then equation (6) implies
(9) ci2   ci1(1   εit 1) 1,
so that, conditioning on consumption growth g   c  2/c  1,
(10)  (  ⏐ )    {ε [( /  ) 1]/g} dF(ε⏐ ).
Now, let us suppose that the change in the distribution of consumption
is as above in subsection 14.2.2. In particular, the share of the bottom 50
percent of households falls from 40 percent in the ﬁrst period to 30 percent
in the second. We maintain our assumption that (one plus) forecast errors
are distributed log normal and that these forecast errors have mean zero.
We also maintain our assumption that the two diﬀerent types of house-
holds are ex ante identical, and use the change in the distribution of con-
sumption to infer the parameters vi that govern the distribution of forecast
errors and risk borne by the households.
Using equations (8) and (10) it is straightforward to compute (see ap-
pendix B) the values of vi implied by this change in distribution. In partic-
ular, households of type 1 will have vi 0.267, while households of type 2 will
have viof 0.55. As an immediate consequence the risk borne by poor house-
holds will be equal to 0.0385, while the risk borne by wealthy households
will be equal to 0.1540 (bear in mind that these risk ﬁgures are denomi-
nated in utils).
The quite surprising result is that the apparent increase in wealthy
households’ share of consumption from 60 to 70 percent on average hurts
the households that were wealthy ex ante. The cross-sectional distribution
of consumption can’t change unless at least some households face some
idiosyncratic risk, and the only way to get the share of ex post wealthy
households to increase is to expose all ex ante wealthy (type 2) households
to a great deal of risk. As a consequence, even though expected consump-
tion is increasing for all households, for type 2 households the probability
of having a big drop in consumption oﬀsets the expected consumption in-
crease. Figure 14.1 shows the distribution of period 2 log consumption for
each of the two household types. Note that although the mean of the type
2 distribution is still greater than the mean of the type 1 distribution, the
much greater variance in outcomes for the initially wealthier households
means that some of these households will be at the very bottom of the con-
sumption distribution in period 2.
This apparently perverse result depends less on the details of our quite
special example than one might suppose. As long as preferences exhibit de-
creasing absolute risk aversion, it will be the initially wealthy households
Risk and the Evolution of Inequality in China 607that will choose to take larger risks. Thus, big falls in the share of the bot-
tom consumption quantile are likely to be due to some previously wealthy
households having very bad luck, while a larger share of previously poor
households will move into higher quantiles. In the example just presented,
the matrix governing the transition between the bottom 50 percent and the
top 50 percent turns out to be
   .
Accordingly, we can see that 12 percent of type 1 households move up into
the top quantile, while 6 percent of type 2 households fall down into the
bottom quantile. The basic ﬂavor of the result seems to depend only on de-
creasing absolute risk aversion and common access to credit markets. With
these two ingredients apparent increases in inequality may actually imply
that ex ante wealthy households are bearing large amounts of risk that of-






Fig. 14.1 Distribution of log consumption for diﬀerent household types implied by
shift in Lorenz curve14.3 The Data
We next turn to an application of some of the ideas developed in the pre-
ceding example and make an eﬀort to draw inferences regarding the risk
borne by households in China from data from the sequence of Lorenz
curves describing the evolution of consumption inequality in China over
the period 1985–2001.
In this section we document a few basic facts about Chinese inequality
and then assume a structure similar to that of subsection 14.2.2, so that
households within a population quantile stay within that quantile, sharing
the variable consumption that accrues to the quantile. In a later section we
instead assume equal access to credit markets and then use variation in
Lorenz curves to draw inferences about idiosyncratic risk.
14.3.1 Chinese Inequality
Numerous authors have documented notable increases in inequality
within China over the last two decades, although over the same period
there has been a dramatic increase in aggregate consumption.
There are two observations about changes in Chinese inequality that
seem to qualify as stylized facts. The ﬁrst is that there have been large in-
creases in the diﬀerence between rural and urban incomes over the last
twenty years, while the second is that there has been increasing inequal-
ity in income across regions (especially between the coastal and interior
areas).
In support of the ﬁrst observation, Kahn and Riskin (2001) document
notable increases in income inequality between rural and urban house-
holds over the period 1988–95. Ravallion (2004) and Chen and Ravallion
(2004) explain part of this increase in urban-rural inequality by computing
the eﬀects of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession on rural and ur-
ban poverty, ﬁnding that on average rural households tend to lose due to
decreases in the price of their mostly agricultural output, while urban con-
sumers gain.
In support of the second observation, a number of authors have docu-
mented notable increases in regional inequality. Yang (1997) documents
large shifts in the resources transferred between coastal and interior re-
gions, and argues that such shifts entail increased regional inequality as a
consequence. While using data on outcomes, Yao and Zhang (2001) docu-
ment increases in interprovincial inequality, and posit the existence of
“clubs” of provinces with incomes diverging from the incomes of other
clubs.
Of course, even if both these observations are true, it may be the case that
one observation is a consequence of the other. In particular, since there is
wide variation in the proportion of rural households across provinces, it
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is simply a consequence of increased rural-urban inequality. Bhalla, Yao,
and Zhang (2003) and Kanbur and Zhang (2005) use data on province-
level incomes to argue that most inequality is due to rural-urban diﬀer-
ences rather than to provincial-level diﬀerences; however, both papers still
ﬁnd a large role for provincial diﬀerences even after accounting for diﬀer-
ences in rural-urban composition.
The general connection between trade and inequality (or poverty) dis-
cussed by Chen and Ravallion (2004) can also be found using much more
aggregate provincial-level data. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) ﬁnd that in-
creases in interprovincial income inequality over time are associated with
diﬀerences in openness, while Zhang and Zhang (2003) decompose a Theil
measure of inequality and ﬁnd that 20 percent of diﬀerences in per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) across provinces in 1995 can be attributed
to measures of trade (Milanovic 2005 shows that it is critical to weight
provinces by population to obtain this result). However, as Ravallion
(2004) cautions, this kind of association between two endogenous aggre-
gates (inequality and trade) doesn’t allow us to draw any inference about
cause.
In an important reminder that inequality isn’t mostly about aggregates,
Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005) examine a large panel of rural Chinese
households and ﬁnd evidence of larger increases in inequality within small
geographical regions than across them.
14.3.2 Urban Inequality
Against this background of rapid increases in overall Chinese inequal-
ity, how should we assess changes in urban inequality? The way in which
inequality changes over time matters greatly for evaluating household wel-
fare. If all the increase in inequality is due to increases in equality between
diﬀerent groups, then the idiosyncratic risk due to this increasing inequal-
ity will be small. For example, one of the key features of Chinese reform
has to do with the fact that reform began in the countryside, with the es-
tablishment of the household responsibility system in the late 1970s and
the corresponding introduction of market prices (at the margin) for agri-
cultural goods. These reforms ushered in a decade of rapid rural economic
growth. The nineties brought an important change. A decade of rural
growth was followed by an extended period of urban growth and relative
rural stagnation. Yang (1997) argues convincingly that this shift was due to
quite conscious and quite visible policy choices made by the central gov-
ernment, which exploited its control of nonagricultural prices to implicitly
tax the interior of the country and to use the proceeds of these implicit
taxes to ﬁnance investment in coastal urban areas. To the extent that one
could predict that urban households would beneﬁt from these policies at
the expense of rural households, neither urban nor rural households would
610 Ethan Ligonface any risk subsequent to this policy shift, but simply diﬀerent expected
growth trajectories.
Since the focus of this paper is on urban households, let us henceforth
set aside changes in overall inequality due to the well-documented diver-
gence in the consumption expenditures of rural and urban China. Instead,
let us ask what our data can tell us about the evolution of inequality among
urban Chinese households.
At the beginning of the period for which we have data, inequality in
China was remarkably low. Although one still does not observe gross in-
equities in the distribution of consumption in China, over the course of
1985–2001 one does observe an increase in urban inequality. This point is
made most clearly by ﬁgure 14.2. This ﬁgure shows the change in Lorenz
curves for urban consumption over the period 1985–2001. Individual
changes are shown year by year. It is apparent from these that inequality is
not always increasing—from year to year one sees increases in equality
with almost the same frequency as decreases. However, the average de-
crease in equality is larger than the average increase, with the consequence
that when we aggregate all these changes, we see that the total change in
Lorenz curves is considerable, with the bottom 60 percent of the distribu-
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Fig. 14.2 Changes in consumption Lorenz curves for registered urban householdstion seeing a fall in its aggregate share of consumption of about 4 percent.
The bottom 10 percent of the distribution sees a much larger (propor-
tional) drop, with its share falling from about 8 percent in 1985 to about 6.5
percent in 2001, or a nearly 20 percent fall. Of course, as we see in table
14.1, this same bottom 10 percent has seen large increases in total con-
sumption, so this fall in share has been much more than oﬀset by increases
in aggregate consumption.
We tackle the measurement of changes in urban inequality in two stages.
First, we use aggregate data on the distribution of consumption expendi-
tures to characterize changes in welfare and inequality acrossconsumption
quartiles. Subsequently we turn our attention to the problem of inferring
the distribution of possible consumption outcomes for individual house-
holds at diﬀerent points in the cross-sectional consumption distribution.
We will use the inferences so drawn to quantify the idiosyncratic risk borne
by these households.
We begin by trying to understand consumption growth by population
quantile. Table 14.1 reports the average rate of consumption growth for
each of eight quantiles over the period 1986–2001. The results of this exer-
cise show that, when averaged over this entire period, there is remarkably
little diﬀerence in the average rate of consumption growth for diﬀerent
quantiles. All of the eight quantiles have consumption growth that aver-
ages about 12 percent per year, and no quantile has a rate of growth sig-
niﬁcantly greater than that of any other quantile.
Of course, the fact that diﬀerent quantiles all have roughly the same rate
of consumption growth over a long period doesn’t imply that there aren’t
diﬀerences over shorter periods. Accordingly, we next ask about how much
of the variation in individual quantiles’ consumption can be explained by
612 Ethan Ligon
Table 14.1 Increasing inequality?
Quartile 5% 10% 20% 40% 60% 80% 90% 100%
Growth rate 0.123 0.117 0.112 0.117 0.110 0.128 0.133 0.113
t-statistic 5.064 4.786 4.593 4.816 4.531 5.272 5.440 4.629
5% 0.000 0.197 0.333 0.176 0.377 –0.146 –0.266 0.308
10% –0.197 0.000 0.136 –0.021 0.180 –0.344 –0.463 0.111
20% –0.333 –0.136 0.000 –0.157 0.044 –0.480 –0.599 –0.025
40% –0.176 0.021 0.157 0.000 0.201 –0.322 –0.442 0.132
60% –0.377 –0.180 –0.044 –0.201 0.000 –0.523 –0.643 –0.069
80% 0.146 0.344 0.480 0.322 0.523 0.000 –0.119 0.454
90% 0.266 0.463 0.599 0.442 0.643 0.119 0.000 0.574
100% –0.308 –0.111 0.025 –0.132 0.069 –0.454 –0.574 0.000
Notes: Average growth rates of consumption expenditures for diﬀerent quantiles of the con-
sumption distribution appear in the ﬁrst row of the table, with t-statistics for these point esti-
mates immediately below. The remaining rows of the table present t-tests of diﬀerences among
the growth rates of diﬀerent quantiles.country-level shocks. We begin by asking what proportion of quantiles’
consumption growth is attributable to aggregate growth. These results are
reported in the ﬁrst row of table 14.2. We see from this that nearly 90 per-
cent of variation in quantile consumption is due entirely to aggregate vari-
ation.
Finally, table 14.3 displays estimates of the welfare loss for households
due to aggregate sources of risk (risk shared by all households in the coun-
try, quantile-level risk related to trade shocks, and residual quantile-level
risk). All measures are denominated in utils and are computed in a manner
analogous to the approach taken by Ligon and Schechter (2003). Note,
however, that these measures of risk completely neglect idiosyncratic fac-
tors. Inferring this idiosyncratic component is the chief task of the re-
mainder of this paper.
14.4 Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section we use the logic developed in the example of section 14.2
to draw inferences about the level of idiosyncratic risk from a sequence of
Lorenz curves. We relax many of the most restrictive assumptions of the
example, developing a more general framework for inference in appendix
A and appendix B. One useful generalization involves giving a parametric
form for the variance (or scale) that governs risk, permitting this variance
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Table 14.2 Analysis of variance of consumption growth
Variables Individual contribution (R2) Cumulative contribution (R2) p-value
Quantile 0.008 0.008 0.998
Country shocks 0.893 0.901 0.000
Import shocks 0.496 0.963 0.998
Table 14.3 Decomposition of risk across quantiles
Sources of risk
Risk Country Trade Quantile risk
5% 0.249 0.323 1.664
10% 0.003 0.196 2.703
20% 0.139 0.101 1.894
40% 0.117 –0.070 1.969
60% 0.002 –0.030 2.372
80% 0.171 –0.062 1.548
90% 0.069 –0.111 2.080
100% 0.057 –0.182 1.779
Note: These ﬁgures do not include estimates of the risk due to idiosyncratic shocks.to depend on a variety of observable variables. The general form for this
scale parameter is given by equation (21).
14.4.1 Error Components Structure
We begin (adapting some language from Amemiya 1984) with a simple
“error components” structure, permitting the log of the variance of the rel-
ative forecast error to depend on the sum of a year-speciﬁc constant and a
quantile-speciﬁc constant, so that
log vit    i    t.
Here vit is the standard error of the relative forecast shock for a household
in the ith quantile of the consumption share distribution in year y; in prac-
tice we divide this distribution into seventeen diﬀerent quantiles, but for
the sake of identifying these parameters we constrain the top quantile to
have  17   0.
Table 14.4 presents the ﬁtted parameters given this error-components
variance structure. Columns (1) and (2) of the table show parameters that
vary across years. Estimates of the normalizing constants { t} appear in
the ﬁrst column of this panel, while the “year eﬀects” part of the variance
structure, { t}, appears in the second column. Recall from our earlier dis-
cussion the interpretation of  t as a measure of the aggregate uncertainty
at time t—this speciﬁcation gives us a simple way to check the model, since
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Table 14.4 Parameter estimates assuming log-normal relative forecast errors and
error-components variance speciﬁcation
 t  t Quantile  i
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1986 1.0635 –1.2862 0.0139 –3.5888
1987 1.1295 –1.1886 0.0278 0.0009
1988 1.2037 –1.1411 0.0539 –0.0004
1989 1.0884 –1.2590 0.0800 3.8415
1990 1.0463 –1.1884 0.1142 –0.6764
1991 1.1009 –1.2512 0.1485 –0.5182
1992 1.1228 –1.1603 0.2280 –0.0510
1993 1.2187 –1.1499 0.3075 –0.2359
1994 1.2660 –1.1199 0.4008 1.5517
1995 1.2004 –1.2411 0.4940 0.0261
1996 1.0926 –1.2052 0.6030 0.3490
1997 1.0868 –1.1026 0.7120 –0.0000
1998 1.0682 –1.2444 0.7756 0.0001
1999 1.1003 –1.2407 0.8393 –0.1229
2000 1.1205 –1.1694 0.9197 0.7127
2001 1.1064 –1.3337
  0.7229
R2 0.4723 t provides a direct measure of aggregate uncertainty. In this case, the cor-
relation between the two measures is 0.47, consistent with our expecta-
tions.
The primary virtue of this error-components speciﬁcation of the struc-
ture of the variance of relative forecast errors has to do with the simplicity
of interpreting estimates of  i and  t. In particular, for years in which  t is
relatively large, the entire population faces greater risk than usual. At the
same time the speciﬁcation allows for variation in uncertainty by wealth
(consumption share); the average household in a quantile for which  i is
negative faces less uncertainty in an average year than do the very wealth-
iest households, while the average household in a quantile with  i greater
than zero faces more.
Turning our attention to diﬀerences in the uncertainty faced by house-
holds across the distribution, consider columns (3) and (4) of table 14.4.
Here we see that the households in the bottom quantile that collectively
consume 1.4 percent of the aggregate face the least uncertainty, with a
quantile ﬁxed eﬀect of –3.59. However, households in the 5–8 percent
quantile face the most, with an estimated quantile ﬁxed eﬀect of 3.84. Eight
of the consumption share quantiles bear more uncertainty than does the
topmost quantile, while seven bear less.
At this point let us pause a moment to be careful about what is meant by
“uncertainty” above. Diﬀerences in the parameters { t} across time or { i}
across quantiles are really just related to the standard deviation of the rel-
ative forecast errors εit. These relative forecast errors have numerous desir-
able properties, but they do not have a straightforward interpretation ei-
ther in terms of the welfare costs of uncertainty or in terms of variation in
quantities that might be observable. In particular, the distribution of εitde-
pends both on households’ risk preferences (here  ) and on the distribu-
tion of consumption growth, making it critical to estimate   and the vari-
ance structure of the forecast errors simultaneously. In the present case, the
estimated value of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 0.723. This is
on the low end of the range of estimates of this parameter in the micro-
econometric literature, but it does not seem obviously wrong.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the risk facing individual households,
we use the parameters reported in table 14.4 to estimate the risk facing the
average household at selected consumption-share quantiles in ﬁgure 14.3.
To construct this ﬁgure we have started with estimates of the measure of
risk given by equation (16), but rather than reporting the welfare loss due
to uncertainty in utils (which may be diﬃcult to interpret), we have com-
puted the growth rate of aggregate consumption expenditures that would
be just enough to compensate households for the risk they bear.
In the present case, because we assume constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) utility functions future aggregate consumption c   t 1 cancels out
of this calculation. Substituting in our estimates of the parameters { t} and
Risk and the Evolution of Inequality in China 615of the marginal Markov transition function makes it possible to use a
simple line-search algorithm to ﬁnd the compensating growth rates.
These compensating growth rates are shown for selected consumption-
share quantiles in ﬁgure 14.3. Note ﬁrst that the growth we refer to is the
rate of growth in aggregate consumption expenditures for urban house-
holds; this quantity grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent over the
period 1985–2001. Using the quantity gt( ) as our measure of the welfare
loss of uncertainty, the poorest (displayed) quantile of households is much
the worst oﬀ—from 1985 to 1986 these households would have needed ur-
ban expenditures to have grown by nearly 14 percent before they would
have preferred the status quo to stagnation and an iron rice bowl. Setting
the poorest households aside, risk does increase in a monotone way, with
households at the 92 percent quantile requiring compensation that never
exceeds 5 percent. Thus, were we to graph it, this measure of risk would dis-
play a U pattern, with the poorest households bearing a great deal of risk,
low-income households bearing the least, and risk gradually increasing
with consumption shares throughout the rest of the distribution.
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Fig. 14.3 Growth rate necessary to compensate for risk, by quantiles
Notes: Each line indicates the minimum rate of growth necessary to compensate for the risk
faced by the average household at the consumption share quantile indicated at the far right.
For example, the line labeled “5” gives the rate of growth in each year necessary to compensate
the average household ex ante at the 5 percent quantile for the risk borne by that household.We now turn our attention from risk to inequality. Recall that we’re now
able to construct estimates of the Markov transition functions. If these func-
tions were invariant across time, it would be a trivial matter to calculate the
future evolution of the distribution of consumption for as many periods as
we choose, simply by using an estimate of some initial distribution   0, and
then applying equation (17) iteratively to trace out future distributions.
Of course, matters are not quite so simple. Instead, we have estimates of
the transition function for sixteen diﬀerent values of t, from 1985–2001,
and while it’s a simple matter to trace out the predicted trajectory over the
course of this sample period, this tells us little about future inequality. We
adopt the following simple strategy. Given our collection of 16 diﬀerent es-
timated transition functions, we simply assume that these functions are
representative of the kinds of transition functions which may be realized in
the future. Thus, to estimate the evolution of the distribution of consump-
tion over   periods we simply make   random draws (with replacement)
from the collection of transition functions {  ˜
t}. Starting with the actual
distribution of consumption shares in 2001, we substitute these draws se-
quentially into (17); inverting the resulting function   t yields an estimate of
the Lorenz curve Lt. Then we use these   equations to calculate one pos-




We repeat this procedure many times, so that we have a bootstrapped





Now, for any population quantile x we can compute a mean trajectory
by computing





or characterize the distribution of possible trajectories by simply working
with the bootstrap sample  .
Figure 14.4 shows values of L  t(x) for selected values of x (the solid
lines),2 along with 80 percent conﬁdence intervals, for predicted trajecto-
ries beginning in 2001 and running through 2025. The ﬁgure has several
notable features. First, note that the conﬁdence intervals are very tight, rel-
ative to the variation across population quantiles. This is a reﬂection of a
fact already noted above—diﬀerences across households are much more
pronounced than diﬀerences across time. The very small variation in our
estimated “time eﬀects” { t} and normalizing constants { t} mean that in
fact our estimated transition functions don’t change very much over time
at all; as a consequence it doesn’t matter very much what actual sequence
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2. These values are those available in the China Statistical Yearbooks, and are equal to
(0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.80, 0.9).Thus emboldened, we henceforth refer to the evolution of L  t. Our esti-
mated model predicts that inequality will continue to increase in China
through 2025, but at a relatively slow rate. However, the bottom ten per-
cent of the population will, by then, consume a much smaller share in 2025
(2 percent) than at present (6.5 percent). Neglecting the welfare costs of
risk discussed above, to keep the level of consumption constant for this
poorest 10 percent of the population, aggregate urban consumption must
grow at an average rate of about ﬁve percent to compensate this part of the
population whose share is sharply declining. To compensate for risk, of
course, much higher growth rates would have to be sustained.
14.5 Conclusion
China’s economy has changed dramatically over the last two decades,
but household level data to understand the eﬀects of China’s growth and
opening to the outside world are very diﬃcult to come by—data from
China’s National Bureau of Statistics either have very limited coverage or
are very aggregated.
In this paper we make a silk purse of a sow’s ear by using aggregate data
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Fig. 14.4 Predicted evolution of consumption shares L(x) for selected population
quantiles xon the distribution of consumption expenditures across (registered) urban
households to construct a sequence of Lorenz curves, and then use in-
tertemporal restrictions on individual households’ consumption expendi-
tures implied by optimizing behavior by risk-averse households to derive
the restrictions on the evolution of these Lorenz curves implied by theory.
The evolution of the Lorenz curve turns out to depend on just two kinds of
objects: household utility functions, and the distribution of “relative fore-
cast errors” for intertemporally optimizing households.
To pin down household utility, we assume that household preferences
exhibit constant relative risk aversion. To pin down the distribution of rel-
ative forecast errors we choose a three-parameter log-normal speciﬁcation,
based on an examination of data from a small subset of urban households
for which we construct the empirical probability distribution for these rel-
ative forecast errors.
For any estimate of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and parameters
governing the distribution of relative forecast errors, we are able to predict a
sequence of future Lorenz distributions. We compare this predicted trajec-
tory with the actual sequence of distributions realized between 1986 and
2001, choosing our preference and distributional parameters so as to mini-
mize a measure of the distance between these sequences of Lorenz curves.
We present two major empirical ﬁndings. First, the risk (ex ante welfare
loss due to variation in future consumption) borne by households depends
much more on households’ resources than it does on the year—even
though there are enormous changes in China’s aggregate economy over
this period, idiosyncratic risk is much more important than any aggregate
shock in determining household welfare and in determining evolution of
inequality over time.
Second, our estimates of the law of motion governing the Lorenz curves
for urban China allow us to make predictions about future consumption
inequality. Looking at the entire distribution, we predict that most of the
increase in inequality between 1985 and 2025 has already occurred; how-
ever, we also predict that the share of consumption accruing to the poorest
decile of these households will continue to fall at a relatively rapid rate,
lowering the share of consumption for these households from 6.5 percent
in 2001 to only 2 percent in 2025.
Appendix A
A Model with Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section we describe a model in which households can exchange debt
in competitive credit markets, and derive restrictions on the evolution of
Risk and the Evolution of Inequality in China 619each household’s share of aggregate consumption. The key assumptions we
exploit are that households all have similar preferences featuring constant
relative risk aversion and that all households have access to credit on the
same terms. Note that this latter assumption is weaker than assuming that
credit markets are perfect—in particular, it may be the case that at the in-
terest rates faced by households for some reason credit markets fail to clear.
Consider, then, an environment with n inﬁnitely lived households. We
index these households by i   1, 2, . . . , n. Time is discrete and is indexed
by t. Household i derives momentary utility from consumption according
to some function ui:   →  , and discounts future utility at a common rate
  ∈ (0, 1).
Intertemporal Restrictions
At any date t, household i can exchange claims to consumption at t   1
with other households at a price 1/ t, solving the problem
(11) max
bit
ui cit        Et ui(cit 1   bit)  ∑
 
j 2
 j 1ui(cit j) ,
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information
available at time t, bit denotes the debt issued by the household at time t,
and cit denotes the household’s time t consumption expenditures.
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the household’s problem of
debt issuance at time tindicate that the household will consume citat tif the
usual Euler equation
(12) ui (cit)      tEtui (cit 1)
is satisﬁed.
It is convenient to restrict our attention to the case in which utility func-
tions exhibit constant relative risk aversion, so that
(13) ui(cit)   ,
where  is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. In this case, equation (12)
implies that
[  t] 1   Et  
  
for all i   1, . . . , n and all t. As a consequence, we have








We can interpret this as a prediction that with the ability to freely exchange
debt all households will have the same expected growth in their marginal
utilities of consumption.





cit 1  
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cit 1  
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cit
1     1
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bit  
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620 Ethan LigonBecause we want to understand the links between intertemporal restric-
tions on consumption such as equation (14) and the evolution of inequal-
ity, we’ll translate equation (14) into a statement about shares of con-
sumption expenditures. Let c  t   Σn
i 1cit denote aggregate consumption
expenditures at t, and   it   cit/c   t denote i’s share of expenditures at t. Then




j 1  
      
      0.
Let




j 1  
      
  
denote household i’s time t forecast error relative to the average forecast
error. Note from the properties of equation (15) that Etεit 1   0, as is usual
when evaluating forecast errors from Euler equations. However, as Cham-
berlain (1984) points out, in the usual analysis there may be an aggregate
shock that induces correlation across households’ forecast errors in the
cross section, so that there is no guarantee that realized forecast errors at
t   1 will in fact average to zero. We’ve avoided this problem here by elim-
inating  t; for us 1/n Σn
j 1 εjt   0 by construction.
Risk
The uncertainty facing any individual household with consumption
share  itat time t that may reduce its utility at time t   1, then, can be sum-
marized by three random variables. The ﬁrst of these just has to do with
variation in the growth of aggregate consumption, gt 1   c   t 1/c   t. The sec-
ond represents household-speciﬁc surprises that may change the house-
hold’s share of aggregate expenditures,  it. Third and ﬁnally, the aggregate
of surprises facing all other households may change the distribution of re-
sources,  t 1   1/n Σn
j 1[( jt 1/ jt].
Deﬁne the idiosyncratic risk borne by the household at time t to be the
ex ante loss in expected utility at t   1 due solely to variation in the purely
idiosyncratic shock εit 1, or
(16) Rit   ui(c   t 1 it)   E[ui(cit 1)⏐It,  t 1, gt 1],
where Itdenotes the information set at time t. Here the ﬁrst term is the util-
ity the household would obtain at t   1 if the household’s share of expen-
ditures was unchanged (as would be the case if no household faced any
idiosyncratic risk) and the household knew in advance what aggregate con-
sumption would be in t   1. The second term is the utility the household
would expect if it somehow knew in advance what the realization of all the
relevant aggregate random variables would be, so that it remained ignorant
only of the idiosyncratic shocks it would experience in the ﬁrst period.
In a world with complete markets and the assumed CES preferences we
c   t 1  
c   t





 it 1  
 it
c   t 1  
c   t





 it 1  
 it
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gate consumption will remain constant, eliminating all idiosyncratic risk.
Thus, we can interpret the ﬁrst term of equation (16) as the utility the
household would obtain if no households bore any idiosyncratic risk less
the expected utility of consumption when the household does bear this
idiosyncratic component of risk. It is trivial to establish that this cardinal
measure of risk is uniquely consistent (up to a linear transformation of ui)
with the notion of increasing risk deﬁned by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Because our measure of idiosyncratic risk is denominated in utils, it is
straightforward to construct a variety of useful measures of the welfare loss
associated with this risk.
Let   t( it 1⏐ it, xit, gt 1,  t 1) denote the time t Markov transition func-
tion for the household’s share   given household characteristics xit and
knowledge of the aggregate quantities gt 1 and  t 1. Then the expression
for household i’s time t idiosyncratic risk, as deﬁned above, may be written
Rit   ui(c   t 1 it)    ui(c   t 1  )d  t(  ⏐ it, xit, gt 1,  t 1).
Note that idiosyncratic risk can depend on both household characteristics
xit and on the household’s current position in the consumption distribu-
tion,  it. Let the distribution of characteristics x of households having a
share   of aggregate consumption time t be given by Gt(x⏐ ). Then to cal-
culate average idiosyncratic risk of households with share   we integrate
out the characteristics x, obtaining the marginal Markov transition func-
tion   ˜
t(  ⏐ , gt 1,  t 1)   ∫(∫  d  t)dGt(x⏐ ).
Let the distribution of   at t be given by   t( ); this is the inverse of the
Lorenz curve. Average idiosyncratic risk is then given by
Rt    ui(c   t 1 )d  t( )    ui(c   t 1  )d  ˜
t(  ⏐ , gt 1,  t 1)d  t( ).
Distribution
The Markov transition function   ˜, which is critical for calculating aver-
age risk in the population, is also critical for understanding how the distri-
bution of resources changes over time. In particular, the inverse Lorenz
curves {  t} satisfy a law of motion
(17)   t 1(  ˆ)    {     ˆ}d  ˜
t(  ⏐ , gt 1,  t 1)d  t( ).
Accordingly, knowledge of the transition functions   ˜
t suﬃces to charac-
terize both average risk and the evolution of inequality in the popula-
tion.
Forecast Errors and Markov Transitions
Recall that an individual household’s uncertainty depends only on rela-
tive forecast errors εit 1,  t 1, and on gt 1. In particular, we can use equation 
(15) to express   ˜
t in terms of the distribution of relative forecast errors in
622 Ethan Ligonthe population. Let εit 1 have the cumulative probability distribution
F t(ε⏐ it, xit). Then note from equation (15) that we have
(18)  it 1    it(g 
t 1εit 1    t 1) 1/ ,
so that
(19)   ˜
t(  ⏐ , gt 1,  t 1)    {ε [( /  )     t 1]/g 
t 1} dF ˜
t(ε⏐ , x)dGt(x⏐ ).
Let F ˜
t(ε⏐ )  ∫dF t(ε⏐ , x)dGt(x⏐ ) denote the marginal distribution of rel-
ative forecast errors ε for households having consumption share  . Then,
because time t   1 shares must integrate to 1, we have the adding-up re-
striction
(20)    ( t 1   εg 
t 1) 1/ dF ˜
t(ε⏐ )d  t( )   1,
which pins down the value of the { t} in terms of the remaining objects in
equation (20). Accordingly, given knowledge of the distributions {(F t, Gt)},
the sequence of realized aggregate consumptions to pin down {gt}, and the
risk aversion parameter  , we can completely describe the evolution of in-
equality and the distribution of risk in the population.
Appendix B
Estimating Idiosyncratic Risk
How can we go about using data on the evolution of Lorenz curves to esti-
mate the risk borne by diﬀerently situated households? Given our main-
tained assumption of equal access to credit markets and some initial dis-
tribution of consumption shares   0, equation (17) allows us to trace out
changes in the distribution over time given knowledge of the Markov tran-
sition functions {  ˜
t} and of the sequence {gt,  t}. However, each {  t} must
be consistent with the law of motion for shares in equation (18), while the
unknown sequence { t} is determined by the adding-up restriction in
equation (20). As a consequence, the extent of our ignorance regarding
{  ˜
t} amounts to ignorance regarding the risk-aversion parameter  and the
marginal distributions of relative forecast errors in each period, {F ˜
t}.
Although we don’t begin with knowledge of the distributions of errors
{F ˜
t}, the ﬁrst moment of each F ˜
t must be equal to zero by equation (12),
while the support of the distribution at t must be a subset of [ t 1/g 
t 1,  ).
After examining the empirical distribution of estimated relative forecast
errors for a small panel of urban Chinese households, it appears that this
empirical distribution at t is adequately represented by what Johnson and
Risk and the Evolution of Inequality in China 623Kotz (1970) call the “three-parameter log-normal distribution,” with log(ε
   t 1) distributed N( t( ), vt
2( )). Of the three parameters ( t,  t( ), vt( ))
only two are free, with  t    t/gt
 —since shares must all lie in the (0, 1) in-
terval—and  t   log( t) – vt
2( )/2 (since the expected value of ε must be
zero).
With these restrictions on the distribution of relative forecast errors, the
only things that remain for us to infer from data are the coeﬃcient of rela-
tive risk aversion   and the scale parameters {vt( )}. In practice we only
work with a ﬁnite number (say n) of share values, and have only a ﬁnite
number of periods (T ) of data on the distribution of consumption. We im-
pose a log-linear structure on these scale parameters, assuming that for
every year t   1, . . . , T and share   ∈ { 1, . . . ,  n} there exists an  -vector
of observable variables xit that determines the scale parameters via
(21) log vt( i)      xit
for some  -vector  . This assumption allows us to estimate a set of   pa-
rameters that may be presumed to be smaller than Tn, and guarantees that
estimated values of vt( ) will be positive, as they must be to be interpretable
as the standard deviation of a normally distributed variable.
As a consequence of the foregoing, we’re left with the problem of esti-
mating     1 parameters b0   ( ,   ). We have data on the share of con-
sumption expenditures for population quantiles (x1, x2, . . . , xm) for each
of T   1 years. We use these data on consumption expenditures to ap-
proximate the Lorenz curves {Lt(x)}T
t 1 of expenditure shares. We ﬁx an
initial guess of our parameters b. Noting that Lt    t
–1, conditional on this
guess we use the law of motion in equation (17) (along with the adding-up
restriction in equation [20], and equation [21]) to predict a sequence of
Lorenz curves {L ˆ
t(x⏐b)}T
t 1. We compute a simple measure of distance be-
tween the predicted and actual Lorenz curves





(Lt(xi)   L ˆ
t(xi⏐b))2,
and then use a simplex minimization routine to ﬁnd the value b ˆ  
argminbd(b).
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Comment Shang-Jin Wei
This is a sophisticated paper. An important contribution of the paper is
methodological in nature. Deaton and Paxson (1994) and other papers in
the literature on income inequality have provided theoretical justiﬁcation
for an empirical speciﬁcation on household panel data. However, a com-
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cross sections are available, rather than a true panel. This is the case for the
data on Chinese urban income that Ethan Ligon is working with. In this
paper, Ligon provides a methodology that can be applied to such data sets.
Speciﬁcally, by integrating the intertemporal restrictions on individual
household consumption, he derives a law of motion for the distribution of
consumption across households at a given point in time. While such a spec-
iﬁcation cannot exploit all the information from a panel household data set
if one exists, it allows researchers to work with more commonly available
(and less demanding) data sets on repeated cross sections of households.
As to possible areas for improvement, I would propose two. First, it
seems possible that some of the key inferences may be driven by noise
rather than information. More robustness checks may be helpful. Second,
conceptually, the paper does not quite address the key question in the
theme of the conference, namely, the impact of globalization on inequality
or poverty. Indeed, it does not quite address the question implied in the title
of the paper—the impact of globalization on China’s inequality. Let me
discuss these two comments in turn.
The ﬁrst comment has to do with noise versus information in the empir-
ical inferences in the paper. The estimates are presented in table 14.1. As an
example, one can look at the estimates of the alphas—the estimated excess
uncertainty an average household in a given quantile faces relative to the
very wealthiest households in the sample. (The author divides the house-
holds into seventeen bins by their income levels.) Which households face
the greatest uncertainty? According to table 14.1, the top ﬁve are those in
the 4th, 9th, 15th, 11th, and 10th quantiles. Which households face the
least uncertainty? Table 14.1 says that the top ﬁve are those in the 1st, 5th,
6th, 8th, and 14th quantile. Why do we observe so much ﬂuctuation in the
ranks? Since the number of bins into which one classiﬁes households is
somewhat arbitrary, how robust is the inference to alternative classiﬁca-
tions? Another set of key parameters is the etas. They are within the range
of [1.04, 1.26]. Can we reject the null that they are all the same? We don’t
know. To summarize the comments so far, before we can conclude which
inferences are robust and which are fragile, it would be useful to perform
more perturbations of the basic speciﬁcation and more statistical tests.
A potentially more serious shortcoming with working with repeated
cross sections is what I call a “shifting base” problem that could render the
resulting inferences invalid and misleading. Recall that the paper makes in-
ferences on the relative rank of risks that urban households face as a func-
tion of their income in the distribution. An important assumption is that
the underlying distribution of the households stays the same even though
in any diﬀerent year a diﬀerent cross section of households gets surveyed.
However, over the period of the sample (1986–97), there may have been
systematic migration from the relatively poor rural areas to relatively well-
oﬀurban areas. In addition, administrative units that were previously clas-
626 Ethan Ligonsiﬁed as rural counties have been gradually reclassiﬁed as cities (and the
households residing there reclassiﬁed as urban households). These facts
imply that the true characters of the households in any given income bin
may change from year to year in the sample. Inferences based on an as-
sumption of a ﬁxed household character may be misleading (especially
when the risk ranks jump around in table 14.1).
My second comment has to do with the theme of the conference—the
impact of globalization on income inequality or poverty, which Ligon’s
paper alludes to in the title but does not directly address. Which part of
change in the Chinese household income over the recent past can be at-
tributed to China’s greater exposure to international trade (and other di-
mensions of globalization)? The answer cannot be inferred from the statis-
tical table and ﬁgures in the current paper.
To start with, let me note the temptation to conclude that globalization
has increased the inequality: China’s exposure to trade and FDI openness
has increased greatly (from a trade-GDP ratio of 5 percent in 1980 to about
35 percent now). At the same time, income inequality as measured by the
Gini coeﬃcient has risen dramatically. This has led some observers to draw
the conclusion that globalization has increased the inequality.
Of course, association does not imply causation. Moreover, inequality is
a function of many factors. If one could isolate the eﬀect of trade global-
ization, what is its eﬀect on China’s household income inequality? This is
the question that Yi Wu and I have looked at. Working with a combination
of household data sets and a data set of urban and rural average incomes,
we decompose the question into three parts: the impact of trade openness
on the within-rural income inequality, the within-urban inequality, and
the inequality between urban and rural areas. We ﬁnd evidence that trade
globalization reduces within-rural inequality, raises the within-urban in-
equality (by a moderate amount), and reduces the rural-urban inequality
(by a signiﬁcant amount). Combining the three ﬁndings, we ﬁnd that
greater trade openness has led to a moderate decline (rather than an in-
crease) in household income. If one is interested in reducing income in-
equality in China, the right approach would not be to reduce the degree of
openness of the already open areas but to speed up the opening-up of cur-
rently less open regions.
I learned much from Ligon’s paper. If the author could work with a true
panel data set and oﬀer more statistical tests, readers’ conﬁdence in the in-
ference could be enhanced.
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